Arms Races and the Onset of War.













Münchener Beiträge  
zur Politikwissenschaft 
 










Arms Races and the Onset of 
War. 
A Review of Game Theory 




Bachelorarbeit bei  






Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 3 
2. Approaching Arms Races and War ........................................................................................... 4 
2.1. Arms Races and War in International Relations ............................................................... 4 
2.2. Formal Explanations of Arms Races ................................................................................. 5 
2.3. Formal Explanations of War .............................................................................................. 6 
3. Literature Overview .................................................................................................................. 7 
3.1. Differential Equation Models ............................................................................................ 7 
3.2. Game Theory Models ...................................................................................................... 10 
3.2.1. Finite Horizon Models ............................................................................................. 10 
3.2.2. Infinite Horizon Models ........................................................................................... 15 
4. Summary of the Predictions ................................................................................................ 18 
5. Modeling ................................................................................................................................. 20 
5.1. Kydd 2000: Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective .............. 20 
5.1.1. The Setting ............................................................................................................... 20 
5.1.2. The Structure of the Game ....................................................................................... 22 
5.1.3. Analyzing the Game ................................................................................................. 23 
5.2. Slantchev 2005: Military Coercion in Interstate Crises ................................................... 30 
5.2.1. The Setting ............................................................................................................... 31 
5.2.2. The Structure of the Game ....................................................................................... 32 
5.2.3. Analyzing the Game: ................................................................................................ 34 
6. Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 40 
7. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 42 
References ...................................................................................................................................... 45 






List of Tables  
Table 1: Modeling Assumptions: Kydd 1997 ................................................................................ 10 
Table 2: Modeling Assumptions: Kydd 2000 ................................................................................ 12 
Table 3: Modeling Assumptions: Slantchev 2005 ......................................................................... 13 
Table 4: Modeling Assumptions: Powell 1993 .............................................................................. 15 
Table 5: Modeling Assumptions: Jackson Morelli 2009 ............................................................... 16 
Table 6: Summary of the Predictions ............................................................................................. 18 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Game Tree: Kydd 2000 .................................................................................................. 22 
Figure 2: Bargaining Range: Kydd 2000 ....................................................................................... 24 
Figure 3: The Arming Decision: Kydd 2000 ................................................................................. 26 







The study of the causes and consequences of arms races developed during the Cold War, but 
whether arms races climax in a war or create a stable peace situation has not been answered 
conclusively so far. Arms races are assumed to have a major impact on states’ security but the 
consent stops here. On the one hand, a build-up by another state and reacting with reinforcing 
one’s own military out of fear can lead to preventive or pre-emptive war. According to this 
explanation, mutual armaments lead to war. The Anglo-German Naval race before the First 
World War is often interpreted in this way. On the other hand, massive arms build-ups could also 
deter another state that is likely to challenge and thus military reinforcement prevents a conflict. 
Hence, arms races lead to peace. The Cold War is often mentioned by deterrence theorists in this 
context (Jervis 1976). 
One subset in this debate has been the formal mathematical modeling of those opposing 
arguments. Depending on the assumptions of the models they predict that states either fight or 
live in peace as a consequence of the arms race. Surprisingly, papers which analyze the question 
of whether arms races lead to war or to peace in one formal model are rare. Louis Richardson 
(1960) and Brito and Intriligator (1984) used differential equations to analyze arms competition. 
Brito and Intriligator (1985), Powell (1993), Kydd (1997, 2000), Slantchev (2005), Jackson 
Morelli (2009) presented further models using game theory.  
In contrast the literature of formal models, which deal separately with the issue why states race or 
why states fight, is vast and their assumptions and predictions have also been widely studied. 
Probably the best developed approach why states race is the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. But 
RPD models remain silent on the link between arms races and war. They just analyze whether 
states race or not (Kydd 2000, 240). James D. Fearon (1995) provided an overview of conditions 
under which states start a fight and illustrated them with game theoretic explanations. But he does 
not address whether states start a war as a consequence of an arms race. 
Moreover, unlike RPD models and formal models of war, comparisons or outlines of the 
assumptions in formal models of arms races and war are only superficial and not satisfying. 
Glaser (2000) provides a general overview on arms races and their causes and consequences 
which addresses the literature in International Relations, case studies and also, formal models. 
Since he covers a broad field of research, the part of formal models does not offer a deeper 
analysis. Dunne and Smith (2007) also outline arms races and the onset of war but their focus lies 
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on empirical studies. Kydd’s textbook (2015) contains a small section on formal arms 
competition models and their impact on war which is very superficial, though.  
Therefore, in my Bachelor Thesis, I will analyze the underlying assumptions of formal models of 
arms races and war. This should provide a first step to an outline of important modeling 
conditions. Furthermore shortcomings and potential room for improvements shall be 
demonstrated. In the first section, a short overview of the non-formal discussion on causes and 
consequences of arms races in International Relations will be given. Subsequently, I show briefly 
the common formalization of the question why states race or not and then, a description of the 
common formal assumptions why states fight or not follows. In the second section, I will provide 
an overview over the formal models which deal with the relation between arms races and war in 
one model. In the third section, I will reasonably select two of these models in order analyze their 
underlying formal assumptions und predictions in detail. The focal point will be how arms races 
affect the likelihood of nations to fight or to come to a peaceful agreement in formal models. 
Therefore, I will especially focus on the common assumptions under which states fight and 
whether these criteria also apply with an included arms race. Finally, the achievements and 
shortcomings of the models shall be compared and discussed.
1
     
2. Approaching Arms Races and War 
I will now describe the two opposing arguments of the causes and consequences of arms races in 
International Relations. Thereafter, the common formal approaches why states start and continue 
to race and why states fight or not will be introduced.  
2.1. Arms Races and War in International Relations  
Two different views determine the discussion concerning arms races and the onset of war in 
International Relations: one side states that an increase in build-ups increases the probability of 
war onset while the opposing view claims that arming is the best option for states to deter 
potential challengers from attacking and therefore provide peace (Glaser 2000, 251). The first 
argument is described by the spiral model which is related to realism: states face an anarchic 
world without a sovereign. In this environment, states are uncertain about the other state’s 
                                                 
1
 When I talk about arms races I will refer to the definition of Buzan and Herrig:  
“Arms racing is an abnormally intense condition in relations between states reflecting either or both active political 
rivalry and mutual fear of the other’s military potential in arms dynamic” (Buzan and Herrig 1998, 78)  
As war definition I use: “War is organized violence carried on by political units against each other” (Hedley Bull 
1977, S. 184).  
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intentions and can only protect themselves with their own strength if the other state is greedy. 
Even if it is sure that other states do not have aggressive motives right now, nothing guarantees 
that they do not have greedy incentives in the future. Therefore, states have to arm in order to 
defend themselves (Jervis 1976, 62). The problem is that self-protection possibly menaces other 
states because they cannot be sure whether the weapons procurement is motivated by security 
seeking or greedy intentions. This is known as the security dilemma where the dominant strategy 
for both states is to arm. The states’ armaments, although intended to achieve security, cause 
mutual fear and can even lead to war. If there seems to be an advantage to strike first due to 
technology or strategy, even a security seeking state which is satisfied with the status quo will 
start a war. The fear of being exploited by the adversary can result in preemptive or preventive 
attack (ibid., 63-67).   
The second approach is based on the deterrence theory: arms races reflect a conflicting 
bargaining process over the status of an issue at stake. A status quo power faces a challenger who 
believes that the status quo power is weak in capability or resolve and wants to overturn the status 
quo. In order to deter the greedy opponent, the content state has to show its ability and 
willingness to fight (Jervis 1976, 58-61). According to this argument, higher arms levels achieve 
peace by reducing the opponent’s probability to win a war. If the status quo power does not 
accumulate enough capabilities deterrence fails and war breaks out. This argument is related to 
power transition theory which assumes, unlike realism, that the world is hierarchically ordered 
(Organski and Kugler 1980). The more powerful states who establish the fundamental rules and 
norms in international behavior are more content with the status quo. The weaker and less 
powerful states represent the potential challengers who want to overturn the status quo and must 
be deterred from doing so (De Mesquita 2006, 585-587). In contrast to the spiral model, where 
fear is the reason why states race, in the deterrence model aggression is the main driver of the 
arms race and the failure of deterrence leads to war.  
2.2. Formal Explanations of Arms Races 
A common game theoretic modeling approach of arms races is the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
The RPD model is related to first International Relations argument by Jervis where an anarchic 
setting of the world leaves defecting as a dominant strategy for both countries. A cooperative 
equilibrium usually represents arms control agreements whereas defection stands for racing 
behavior. Although, mutual armament is the common equilibrium, reducing arms can also be 
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sustained by the shadow of the future and punishing strategies such as “Tit-for-Tat” (Axelrod 
1984; Downs and Rocke 1990). The main problem with RPD models is that they lack the 
possibility of an attack. They just provide a formal modeling approach for the question of why 
states race or not (Kydd 2000, 240). Accordingly, RPD models provide only limited explanations 
when we analyze how arms races affect the onset of war.  
2.3. Formal Explanations of War 
James D. Fearon (1995) introduced rationalist explanations for war by criticizing that neorealist 
explanations for war are not completely satisfying since war is costly and risky ex post, even 
under anarchy. He concedes that anarchy and the security dilemma which are the main drivers  of 
arms races and war in the spiral model might cause arms races and territorial competition but do 
not explicitly address why rational states engage in war. He claims that positive costs of war 
always provide a bargaining range and that rational states would be better of avoiding the costs 
by coming to an agreement ex ante (Fearon 1995, 380). For these considerations to hold three 
assumptions are needed: the states know that there is some true probability that one state will win 
the war; States are assumed to be risk-averse or risk-neutral over the issue at stake; The issue is 
perfectly divisible (ibid., 388). After proving the existence of a bargaining range (with respect to 
the mentioned assumptions) Fearon addresses three circumstances under which even rational 
states possibly engage in war, although they would be better off living in peace:  
1. Uncertainty about the balance of power, the preferences or the costs of fighting and incentives 
to misrepresent these criteria the states are not able to choose the right offer because they have 
wrong assumptions about the bargaining range (ibid., 390-401).    
2. Problems in credibly committing to uphold a deal under the lack of a central authority: a first-
strike advantage or a large shift of power in the next round of the game reduces the probability of 
peace (ibid., 401-409).  
Jervis also stresses that first-strike advantages cause war in the spiral model (Jervis 1976, 67). In 
contrast, Fearon claims that first-strike advantages only cause war themselves under extremely 
odd conditions. It is more likely that the first-strike advantage narrows the bargaining range and 
in combination with uncertainty or an indivisible issue it is even harder to achieve a peaceful 
solution (Fearon 1995, 403). 
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3. Issue Indivisibilities: the states are not able to split the good because it has some strategic value 
or it is simply not possibly to divide it. Who will sit on the throne can be such a problem (ibid., 
382). 
I add a fourth condition which Fearon does not mention in his Paper. Nevertheless, I will also 
consider this modeling assumption because it is important for repeated games. 
4. Discounting future payoffs/ shadow of the future: a discount factor refers to how states value 
future payoffs in repeated games. In RPD models a high discount rate means that the states highly 
value future payoffs and, therefore, they are more likely to cooperate. In contrast, in bargaining 
models a higher discount factor can even make war more likely because war is temporary 
preferred to achieve a secure future (Kydd 2015, 146-147). 
Summing up, the two opposing IR arguments provide reasonable rationales why arms races can 
end up in war or peace but do not include a richer formalization of those explanations. The vast 
RDP literature provides a formal modeling approach why states start an arms race but does not 
include a war decision. Fearon’s rational explanations for war are a major contribution when it 
comes to formal explanations of a war but does not contain formal modeling conditions of the 
causal relationship of arms races and war. I will now summarize the literature which deals with 
arms races and war in one formal model and select two of them in order to exemplarily analyze 
under which modeling assumptions arms races do lead to war or peace. Therefore, I will 
especially refer to the formal explanations of war under which states fight, mentioned in point 
2.3., and whether these criteria also apply with an included arms race.   
3. Literature Overview 
3.1. Differential Equation Models 
3.1.1. Richardson 1960: Arms and Insecurity 
The “Richardson model” is a common starting for the study of arms races and the onset of war. It 
consists of two differential equations which describe the rate of change of two countries’ missile 
stocks over time (Richardson 1960, 16). Richardson argued that the likelihood of nations 
engaging in a war depends on their reaction to each other’s weapons build-ups, the economic 
burden of additional weapons and the state’s grievances.     
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 are the rates of change of the countries missiles over time. The expressions 𝑘𝑦 and 𝑘𝑥 
stand for each country’s additional defense build-ups which are a reaction to the other country’s 
weapons build-ups at time t (Richardson 1960, 16). 𝑎𝑦 and 𝛽𝑦 are constants which characterize 
the fatigue and the economic burden of additional arming. The terms g and h represent the 
“grievance” of a country. A positive grievance term represents a dissatisfied state and a negative 
term represents a content state (ibid., 15-16). If the defense coefficients outweigh to economic 
burden the states end up in a runaway arms race which is identified with war. A stable situation 
can be reached if the economic burden is higher than the defensive reaction to the other side’s 
build-ups (ibid., 24-28). The implications of the model are similar to spiral model in IR since 
Richardson states that the main driver of a runaway arms race is the defense armament as a 
reaction to the other sides build-ups. A central shortcoming of this model is that, although 
Richardson is concerned about the connection of arms races and war, he does not explicitly 
model the state’s decision to go to war. Hence, he only identifies the unstable runaway arms race 
situation with war but lackes an explicit description why states decide to fight against each other.   
3.1.2. Brito and Intriligator 1984: Can Arms Races lead to the Outbreak 
of War? 
Brito and Intriligator 1984 introduce another differential equation model which claims to 
formalize the connection between an arms race and the onset of war. According to their model, 
an arms race can lead to war or to peace. Disarmament does not guarantee a peaceful outcome. 
The authors first implement a model of a missile war which can be seen as a military strategy 
developed by defense experts (Brito and Intriligator 1984, 63; 66). The hypothetical conflict 
consists of two rival countries and is modeled by four differential equations which describe the 
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 terms stand for the casualties caused by 
the opponents’ force over time. These casualties consist of (1 − 𝑎′)𝑎𝑀𝐴, the proportion of A’s 
missiles shooted at B cities. Likewise, (1 − 𝛽′)𝛽𝑀𝐵 are the number of B’s casualties. The 
coefficients 𝑓𝐵 , 𝑓𝐴, 𝑣𝐵 , 𝑣𝐴  describe the effectiveness of the shot missiles. At t = 0, there is no 
reduction of the countries’ weapons stocks and no casualties.  
Depending on the least acceptable casualties provoked by the initial number of missiles, states 
can either follow a deterrence or an attack strategy. Those strategies can be used to derive missile 
levels where both states deter each other or where both states are able to attack the other state 
(ibid., 67-69). An arms race causes war whenever the build-up enters an area where one state is 
able to engage in war (ibid., 73-78).  
In contrast to the Richardson model, the Brito and Intriligator model provides a formalization of 
the war, but it does not explain why states end up in an arms race. The differential equations only 
show the process of a war and whether this war is acceptable depending on the maximum 
acceptable rate of casualties. The accumulation of the weapon stocks before t = 0 is not modeled. 
In addition, the model does not include any payoff reductions caused by the economic burden of 
the acquisition of weapons. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the effectiveness parameters 
provide a formalization of qualitative and not only quantitative improvements of weapons. 
According to Brito and Intriligator (2000) technical innovations become more and more 
important after the Cold War. The model yields the conclusion that a qualitative improvement of 
the weapons is more dangerous than a quantitative one because more weapons are needed in 
order to deter a technologically advanced nation (ibid., 78-82). These results are contrary to 
Huntington (1958) who claimed that quantitative arms races are more harmful. 
After reviewing the literature about the differential equation models, I will now turn to the 
literatue about game theory models. In general, the differential equation models do not include 
decisions; they just describe a process that happens after entering some initial values. In contrast, 
the game theoretic approach explicitly models strategic decisions given the choices of another 
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individual. Therefore, I believe they are more useful when we want to study arms races and their 
linkage to war. All of the finite horizon models are bargaining models which means that the 
models include some issue at stake. In contrast, the later explained infinite horizon models do not 
include bargaining situations. During the review of the game theory models, I will only mention 
the most important assumptions. The remaining influencing assumptions are summarized in the 
tables.    
3.2. Game Theory Models 
3.2.1. Finite Horizon Models 
3.2.1.1. Kydd 1997: Game Theory and the Spiral Model  
 
Table 1: Modeling Assumptions: Kydd 1997 
Number of Players I = {1,2}; Player 1, Player 2 
Number of Stages 3 
Information Structure Two-sided Incomplete Information: Uncertainty 
about Preferences 
Offense-Defense-Balance First-Strike-Advantage 
Discount Factor No 
Solutions Concept Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
Divisible Good No 
Risk Attitude Risk-Neutral 
Status Quo Yes 
Arms Race Yes 
 
Kydd presented a formal modeling approach of Robert Jervis’s spiral model in order to analyze 
whether weapons build-ups serve as a signal that can drive security seeking states more 
suspicious and even lead to an attack (Kydd 1997, 371-372). The suspicion of the other state’s 
intentions is modeled by two sided incomplete information. The states do not know whether the 
other state is greedy or security seeking and they do not know what the other states thing about 
them. A state’s belief about how its motives are perceived influences how it interprets the 
potential build-up of the opponent. This yields four possible types for each player: security 
seeking and fearful, security seeking and trusting, greedy and trusting and greedy and fearful. 
Security seekers are content with the status quo and greedy players wish to overturn it. Fearful 
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players think that the other state is greedy and trusting states believe that the other state is 
security seeking (ibid., 374). In the first round, the players start with the decision whether to 
attack or not which is not observable. If neither side attacks, both players can decide to build 
weapons or to wait. The build-up decision is also not observable to the opponent. The military 
spending improves the state’s probability of winning a war but it is also costly. The game moves 
to the second round regardless of whether they had built or not and the players choose 
simultaneously either to attack the other player or to defend (ibid., 379-381). If the first-first-
strike advantage is not too high, all players defend in the first round. All greedy types build in the 
second round in order to improve their military strength. The security seeking and fearful types 
build as well because they suppose that their opponent is greedy. The only type who is not 
building is the security seeking and trusting type. All greedy types attack after the build-up round 
because of their high valuation for war. The security seeking fearful types will only attack if they 
observe a build-up in the second round. The security seeking and trusting types never build and 
do not attack. Hence, there is war whenever the two players are greedy and there is no war if both 
players are security seeking and trusting. Kydd’s main point of interest is what happens if the two 
players are security seeking and fearful types. So, each state is actually satisfied with the status 
quo but each player believes that the other state is greedy. What happens is that both players 
build in the first round and the possibility that the other player is really greedy raises. 
Accordingly, both states attack in the second round because they think the other side is greedy 
and will attack. Hence, the build-up between two security seeking and fearful types leads to war 
(ibid., 384-386). Summing up, the main driver of the armament by security seeking fearful types 
is uncertainty. If the states completely observed each other’s decision the states would not arm 
and fight. The arms race does not reveal the state’s true type and uncertainty persist. War happens 
because the build-ups serve as a signal that enhances the state’s belief that the other side is greedy 
and will attack for sure. The first-strike advantage further enforces the risk of war under 
uncertainty. In this model, the arms race causes war as the states have to fight if they observe a 
build-up. Not fighting would make them worse of since they believe to be attacked with a high 
probability. These results are in accordance with Fearon’s modeling assumptions of war: 
uncertainty, wrong believes and a first-strike advantage are the main drivers of the arms race and 
the war. Both states would neither arm nor fight under complete information because they could 
observe that the other side is not greedy. Like in the IR spiral model argument, they would rather 
live in peace with the status quo. 
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3.2.1.2. Kydd 2000: Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the 
Hawk Perspective 
 
Table 2: Modeling Assumptions: Kydd 2000 
Number of Players I = {1,2}; Player 1, Player 2 
Number of Stages 8 
Information Structure Complete Information Version and Incomplete 
Information Version: Uncertainty about relative 
Power 
Offense-Defense-Balance No 
Discount Factor No 
Solution Concept Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium; Perfect 
Bayesian Equilibrium 
Divisible Good Yes 
Risk Attitude Risk-Averse 
Status Quo Yes 
Arms Race Complete Information Version: No; Incomplete 
Information Version: Yes 
 
The model presented by Kydd is one of the first to formalize the relationship between arms races, 
bargaining and war, in the spirit of deterrence theory (Kydd 2000, 229). The only other model 
which includes those three components is Brito and Intriligator (1985). However, their model has 
some drawbacks since its results in the incomplete information version are not subgame perfect 
(Brito and Intriligator 1985, 953). Kydd focuses on the complete information version, but he also 
presents an incomplete information version. The model is structured as follows: two states 
bargain over a perfectly divisible issue space between zero and one and their preferences are 
strictly opposed. A status quo exists which can be reallocated or maintained depending on the 
arms levels, the income of the states and the location of the status quo. In the first round, player 1 
can make an offer and player 2 can accept or reject it. This is followed by build-up rounds where 
both players can spend a fraction of their income in military equipment. The military spending 
not only improves the state’s probability of winning a war it also provides the states a better 
bargaining outcome. Unfortunately, armament causes a loss in consumption and the states cannot 
spend their whole income on weapons. After both states armed player 1 can make a second offer 
and player 2 can accept or reject it. At the last stage both players can decide whether to attack or 
not (Kydd 2000, 233-234). If one state chooses to attack, both sides suffer the costs of a war. In 
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the complete information version, there is always a reachable solution of the issue at stake that 
both sides prefer over war (ibid., 236). The military spending can be reduced but there is no 
possibility that it declines to zero. In the incomplete information version, player 2 faces 
uncertainty about the income and the relative power of player 1. This informational setting can be 
accompanied by a higher military spending, but the higher armament does not lead to war (ibid., 
241). Conclusively, in the complete information version there is neither an arms race nor a war. 
In the incomplete information version, an arms race can happen in equilibrium, but is never 
followed by a war. As deterrence theory predicts, arms races do not lead to war in Kydd’s model. 
Moreover, the incomplete information version of the model does not have any war equilibria. 
This is surprising regarding Fearon’s rationalist explanations for war and also contrary to results 
in Kydd (1997) where uncertainty led to war. In Kydd (2000) uncertainty seems to cause higher 
armaments but the states are still able to implement a solution which is better than fighting. 
Eventually, arms races happen but they do not lead to war and deterrence never fails, even under 
uncertainty.  
3.2.1.3. Slantchev 2005: Military Coercion in interstate Crises 
 
Table 3: Modeling Assumptions: Slantchev 2005 
Number of Players I = {1,2}; Player 1, Player 2 
Number of Stages 4 
Information Structure One-Sided-Incomplete: Uncertainty about 
Preferences  
Offense-Defense-Balance Defense-Advantage 
Discount Factor No 
Divisible Good  No 
Solution Concept Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
Risk Attitude Risk-Neutral 
Status Quo Yes 
Arms race Depends 
Arms race leads to war Depends 
 
Like Kydd 1997, Slantchev only describes an incomplete information model. His focus lies on 
how states can credibly signal their intentions by the show of force and claims that military 
movements have tying hands and sunk costs effects (Slantchev 2005, 533). Slantchev analyzes 
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the conditions under which deterrence by arms build-ups succeeds or fails and how armament 
signals the state’s intentions in crises bargaining. He presents a model where two states compete 
over a territory. The good is not divisible and Player 1 is currently in possession of it. Both states 
have a valuation for the territory which ranges between zero and one. Player 1 is uncertain about 
player 2’s valuation for the territory. The model consists of four rounds: in the first round, player 
1 can decide whether to arm or not. If he does not arm, player 2 gets the territory and the game 
ends. If he arms, the game continuous and player 2 can also decide whether to arm or not. As in 
the first round the game ends when player 2 does not build and continues if he builds. During the 
next stages, both states can decide in sequence whether to attack or not and, in case of an attack, 
the game ends. The probability of prevailing in war is a function of each side’s arms build-ups 
(ibid., 535-536). In contrast to Kydd 1997 where arms races led to war under uncertainty, and 
Kydd 2000 where arms races led to peace under complete and incomplete information, 
Slantchev’s model contains multiple equilibria: one involving no arms race and no war, one 
where mutual build-up takes place but player 1 backs down and one involving war after 
overserving the build-up (ibid., 537-538). Thus, in this model an arms race can lead to peace or to 
war. These results are ambiguous from the formal modeling point of view. The solution of the 
model is complex and it is not so clear how the assumptions influence the arms race-war relation 
from the first angle. Uncertainty and the presence of an indivisible good normally enable war 
equilibria but a defense advantage lessens the probability of war. Because Slantchev mainly 
focuses on the debate over tying hands versus sunk costs in his model, he does not explicitly 
address the interaction of the arms build-ups and the modeling assumptions. This would require 
further analyses.     
I will now describe infinite horizon models which have the possibility of multiple arming rounds 




3.2.2. Infinite Horizon Models 
3.2.2.1. Powell 1993: Guns, Butter, Anarchy 
 
Table 4: Modeling Assumptions: Powell 1993 
Number of Players I = {1,2}; Player 1, Player 2 
Number of Stages Infinite 
Information Structure Complete Information 
Offense-Defense-Balance Depends on the Parameter 
Discount Factor Yes 
Solution Concept Markov Perfect Equilibrium 
Risk Attitude Depends on the Parameter 
Arms Race Yes 
Arms Race leads to War Depends 
 
Powell presents an infinite horizon model in which two states must decide in each period how to 
allocate their resources and whether to attack or not. The players can either buy weapons to 
defend themselves or they can consume goods to satisfy domestic needs (guns vs. butter choice). 
The model contains only a complete information version, so the motivations of the other states 
are clear. Two main variables in the model are the offense-defense balance and a parameter 
which describes whether the players are risk-averse, risk-neutral or risk-acceptant. The states 
alternately decide about the allocation of their military resources and whether to attack or not. It 
is noteworthy that the military allocations only last two stages and, therefore, they do not 
accumulate during the game. The game continues as long as neither state attacks. If one of the 
states decides to attack the probability of prevailing is a relative function of the state’s 
allocations. The loser is defeated as a military power and the victor can save the investment in 
weapons for all time (Powell 1993, 121-122). Because of the complete information structure and 
the alternate decision of the states, both can observe the other’s allocation perfectly and, 
therefore, anticipate the decisions in the future periods. Both states arm at their optimal 
deterrence level and there will be no war at any stage of the game. As the offense-defense 
balance shifts towards the offense and as the states became more risk-acceptant military spending 
increases but does not lead to war unless the parameters have extreme values. Thus, higher 
military spending reduces the status quo payoff because the states have less left to consume and 
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the probability of war raises but does not lead to war (ibid., 127). A longer shadow of the future 
leads to higher military allocations which seems peculiar and is contrary to results in RPD 
models. A deviation by an attack right now means suffering an immediate loss as arming reduces 
consumption. The incentive to attack is that the states’ expected future consumption will exceed 
the status quo allocation. Thus, the longer the shadow of the future, the higher the expected 
payoff from deviation right now. The reason for this result is the guns-butter-decision which 
yields that the states value security or war (higher weapons level) because it promises higher 
future consumption (ibid., 120). These results confirm that under complete information there will 
be no war. Even though, the model includes no bargaining, the results are similar to Fearon’s 
rationalist explanations for war: the first-strike advantage and a more risk-averse attitude yield a 
higher probability for war. The states can anticipate the other states’s arming decision and arm 
for deterrence (Jackson Morelli 2009, 289). Therefore, I would argue that in Powell’s model 
arming leads to peace as the IR deterrence argument predicts. The reason for the arms race is that 
the states want to secure future consumption. Unlike in RPD models, a greater shadow of the 
future raises the risk of war and does not lead to cooperation. It is rather the need to satisfy 
internal claims and the complete information structure with leads to peace. A main shortcoming 
of this model is the fact that weapons do not accumulate over time. This is very restrictive and 
distortive assumption since weapons are goods which last long times.  
3.2.2.2. Jackson Morelli 2009: Strategic Militarization, Deterrence 
and Wars 
 
Table 5: Modeling Assumptions: Jackson Morelli 2009 
Number of Players I = {1,2}; Player 1, Player 2 
Number of Stages Infinite 
Information Structure Complete Information with simultaneous decision 
Offense-Defense-Balance No 
Discount Factor Yes 
Solution Concept Markov Perfect Equilibrium 
Risk Attitude Risk-Neutral 
Arms Race Yes 




Jackson and Morelli present an infinite horizon model involving two states. The model is similar 
to Powell’s model as both states decide how to allocate their resources and whether to attack or 
not. But in contrast to Powell’s model, the arms decision is made simultaneously before the states 
decide whether to fight or not. Accordingly, the players cannot observe the other’s build-ups and, 
therefore, not completely anticipate the other’s decision. The simultaneous decision creates an 
uncertain environment about the relative power of the two states. The arming decision is a costly 
guns-versus-butter choice where build-ups cause a loss in consumption. The build-ups also 
improve the chance of defeating the opponent forever. A victory means overtaking some 
recourses of the opponent and never spending own recourses in weapons anymore (Jackson and 
Morelli 2009, 281). The authors introduce three possible armament levels for the states: low, 
middle and high. In equilibrium, the states mix over their armament decision because the 
simultaneous allocation does not allow for pure strategies. This result holds, if the costs of 
fighting are not overly high and the costs of a build-up are not overly low (ibid., 281-282). A war 
happens if in some round one state’s armament is high and the other state’s armament is low. In 
contrast peace prevails if a middle level meets a high level or the middle level meets a low level. 
This structure yields mixed strategies: if both states armed at a high level every round, then one 
could lower its armament to the middle level and save costs without risking an attack. If both 
armed at the middle level, one could deviate to the low level and again save costs without being 
attacked. If both armed at the low level, one could choose the high level and defeat the other state 
with a high probability which guarantees no more arms spending in the future. Hence, both states 
choose all three levels with some probability in equilibrium in order to keep the other player 
indifferent over the spending decision. Although, a high level of arming in every period would 
lead to peace, it reduces overall utility in comparison to the mixed strategy because the military 
spending reduces consumption. The states rather accept a risk of being attacked in order to satisfy 
domestic needs than arming to achieve certain deterrence. The arms build-ups only lead to war if 
a low and a high level build-up meet which happens with some probability. So, both states arm at 
a certain level in order to deter the other from attacking. The uncertainty caused by the 
simultaneous decision and the guns vs. butter choice induce the states to accept a risk of war. 
Therefore, deterrence by building weapons prevails or fails with some probability and, therefore, 
arming leads to war with some probability (ibid., 282-289). The main problem with this model as 
with Powell’s model is that the weapons do not accumulate over time and are fully depreciated. 
The build-up decision only influences the likelyhood of winning in the related period which is not 
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suitable for an arms race model. Suppose, player 1 chooses six times a high level while player 2 
chooses the middle level. Then player 1 chooses the middle level four times while player 2 
chooses the low level. If player 2 would then arm at a high level and player 1 at a low level in the 
11
th
 round and the players go to war, player 2 would win with a higher probability than player 1. 
Although, player 1 has always armed at a higher level in the previous rounds, these build-ups do 
not matter which is not realistic as weapon stocks can last very long times. To be an adequate 
arms race model, the weapons stocks should accumulate over the periods.  
Fearon 2011 included accumulating weapons stocks in an infinite horizon game. In his model, the 
states either build in every period and deterrence hold or fight at the beginning in order to avoid 
the costly race (Fearon 2011, 1). But this paper remains unpublished. 
 
I will now summarize the main points, the assumptions and predictions of the models in order 
explain why I choose Kydd (2000) Slantchev (2005) for a deeper analysis of their assumptions 
and predictions.  
4. Summary of the Predictions 
 
Table 6: Summary of the Predictions 





Kydd 2000 (Game Theory 
Finite Horizon) 
Brito & Intriligator 1984 
(Differential Equation 
Model) 
Kydd 1997 (Game Theory 
Finite Horizon) 
Powell 1993 (Game Theory 
Infinite Horizon) 
Slantchev 2005 (Game 
Theory Finite Horizon) 
  Jackson & Morelli 2009 





The table shows that regardless of whether the models are older or newer, whether they are 
differential equation models, finite horizon models or infinite horizon models, they all come to 
different predictions. Most of the models which I introduced above do work with the concept of 
peace by deterrence. The states armed at a high level to prevent an attack and war is a result of 
insufficient arming which leads to deterrence failure (Brito and Intriligator (1984), Kydd (2000), 
Slantchev (2005), Powell (1993), Jackson and Morelli (2009)). The only two models which 
include a spiral argument are Richardson (1960) and Kydd (1997). In their models, weapons 
accumulations lead to war. 
The models of Richardson (1960) and the Brito & Intriligator (1984), which base on differential 
equations, do include neither the attack nor the arms race decision. Therefore, they are not 
suitable for the analysis how arms race affect the state’s war decision.  
Powell (1993) and Jackson Morelli (2009) provide an infinite horizon game which is useful for 
arms races since they can last a long time and include many periods of arming. Arms races can 
lead to war under uncertainty but do not lead to war in the complete information version. A first 
strike advantage and gambling preferences lead to a higher probability of war. The models lack 
an important factor: the state’s weapons do not accumulate over time. The allocated weapons of 
the previous periods do not matter for the current situation. Therefore, a state can have a higher 
probability in prevailing in war although it always armed at a lower rate than its opponent in the 
previous periods.   
In contrast to Powell (1993) and Jackson and Morelli (2009), the models provided by Kydd 
(1997, 2000) and Slantchev (2005) only include one round of mutual arming. All three models 
allow for bargaining over an issue at stake and show how arming works as a signal. In Kydd 
(1997), under uncertainty and a first-strike advantage an arms race leads to war as the IR spiral 
model predicts. However, in Kydd (2000) arms races do not lead to war, even under uncertainty. 
The good is perfectly divisible and deterrence never fails. Slantchev (2005) contains multiple 
possible equilibria in an uncertain environment where states bargain over an indivisible good and 
face a defense advantage. Mutual armament can be avoided; arms races can either lead to war or 
to peace.   
I decided to analyze Kydd (2000) and Slantchev (2005), although they both include only one 
round of arming. Nevertheless, I think it is quite interesting how those models yield such 
different outcomes: Kydd (2000) has no equilibria where an arms race is followed by war, even 
under uncertainty. This result is opposed to the common findings in game theory models of war 
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initiation where uncertainty provides war equilibria. Therefore, it would be very interesting to 
find out whether the arms race is the reason why peace prevails even under uncertainty. Kydd 
(2000) is further the only model with a complete and an incomplete information version. Hence, 
it should be possible to see how the information structure affects the arms race – war decision in 
the same model. Moreover, it is the only model which contains a divisible good. In contrast, in 
Slantchev’s model, states bargain over an indivisible good. By comparing Kydd (2000) and 
Slantchev (2005), it might be possible to deduce the influence of the structure of the good on the 
arms race-war decision. As Slantchev (2005) has many possible equilibria, it is very interesting 
how the arms race affects or whether armament causes those different equilibria. Therefore, I will 
exemplarily analyze and compare Kydd (2000) and Slantchev (2005). The theoretical and 
mathematical assumptions and their predictions about how arms races affect whether states fight 
or not will be studied in the following section. 
5. Modeling 
5.1. Kydd 2000: Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk 
Perspective 
I will first analyze the complete information version and second the incomplete information 
version. Player 1 will be called “he” and player 2 “she”. In the complete information version, I 
will exemplarily describe the mathematical solution of the attack decision, the second bargaining 
round and the military spending decision of player 2. Since, those choices suffice to give an 
impression how the game is solved. For the military spending decision of player 1, the first 
bargaining round and the incomplete information version, I will restrict myself to the description 
of the assumptions and their impact on the arms-war decision.  
5.1.1. The Setting 
The model describes an interstate dispute over the good x ϵ [0,1] among two states, S1, S2. The 
states’ interests are strictly opposed: S1’s utility is increasing in x and S2’s utility is decreasing in 
x. Thus, S1 receives the payoff (x) and S2 the payoff (1 − 𝑥). The status quo distribution is 
denoted x
0
. The game starts with a bargaining round where S1 makes an offer (x’) and S2 can 
accept or reject it. The game then moves to the arms building decision regardless of the outcome 
in the bargaining round. Player S1 starts the build-up and decides to allocate military equipment 
m1 ϵ [0,1]. In the next stage, player S2 builds m2 ϵ [0,1]. The model includes a “guns-butter” 
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decision since the military equipment mi is a fraction of the states’ national income yi and causes 
a loss in consumption. The states’ absolute level of spending is denoted 𝑀𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝑦𝑖 and their 
relative power is described by 𝑝(𝑀1, 𝑀2). The relative power increases with 𝑀1and decreases 
with 𝑀2. Player S1’s chance of winning is denoted 𝑝 and player S2’s chance of winning is 
(1 − 𝑝). If 𝑀2 increases, the relative power decreases for S2 but since its chance of winning 
(1 − 𝑝) is strictly increasing with a smaller 𝑝, higher military allocation for S2 still increases its 
chance of winning. The build-up rounds are followed by a second bargaining round where player 
S1 offers (𝑥′′) ϵ [0,1] and S2 accepts or rejects it. Afterwards, the game moves to the attack 
decision and player S1 can decide whether to attack or not. If he attacks the game ends, if not, 
player S2 can choose between attacking and not attacking. If neither player attacks, the 
agreements of the second bargaining round remains in place and if there was no agreement, the 
agreement of the first bargaining round holds. If no agreement was reached in the first round, the 
status quo remains in place. In case of a war, the winner gets the entire good and the loser is left 
with nothing. The costs of war for both sides are 𝑤𝑖 and these costs are low enough so if the 
players were certain to win, they would attack. The payoffs for war are 𝑢𝑖(𝑝, 𝑚𝑖) − 𝑤𝑖 and the 
peace payoffs are 𝑢𝑖(𝑥, 𝑚𝑖) (Kydd 2000, 234).“The utility functions are continuous, twice 
differential, and increase with one’s own consumption and chance of winning with diminishing 
marginal returns” (Kydd 2000, 234).  
Three important assumptions are already given here: First, the good over which the states bargain 
is divisible since all intermediate outcomes (x) between zero and one are available. Second, the 
states are fully informed over the situation in the complete information version of the game. 
Third, the players are risk-averse. These three assumptions normally facilitate the achievement of 




5.1.2. The Structure of the Game 
 
Figure 1: Game Tree: Kydd 2000 
 
Source: Kydd, Andrew (2000): Arms Races and Arms Control. Modeling the Hawk Perspective.  





5.1.3. Analyzing the Game 
5.1.3.1. Complete Information Version 
 
The War Decision 
For player 2 not to attack it must be the case that 𝑢2𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑥, 𝑚2) ≥ 𝑢2𝑤𝑎𝑟(𝑝, 𝑚2) −  𝑤2 and for 
player 1 𝑢1𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑥, 𝑚1) ≥ 𝑢1𝑤𝑎𝑟(𝑝, 𝑚1) −  𝑤1. The payoff functions for war and for peace differ 
in 𝑝 and 𝑥, but they still have the same slope. The y-intercept is lower for the war payoff than for 
the peace payoff because of the positive costs for war 𝑤𝑖. Hence, if 𝑥 = 𝑝, the peace utility is 
always higher than the war utility. In order to achieve equal war and peace utilities, 𝑝, the utility 
of winning the war, must be greater than 𝑥 for S1 and smaller than 𝑥 for S2. These conditions 
define the reservation values of 𝑥 for the second bargaining round where the states are indifferent 
between fighting and accepting the peaceful solution. The bottom line, the smallest portion of the 
good that states are willing to accept instead of fighting, are denoted 𝑥1
′′ for S1 and 𝑥2
′′ for S2. S1 
does not accept any solution smaller than 𝑥1
′′ and S2 does not accept any solution greater than 𝑥2
′′ 
(since S2’s preferences,1 − 𝑥, are strictly opposed to S1’s preferences). Accordingly, S1 would 
attack if 𝑥 < 𝑥1
′′ and S2 would attack if 𝑥 > 𝑥2
′′. Since, 𝑥1
′′ < 𝑝, and 𝑥2
′′ > 𝑝 both states are better 
or at least not worse of accepting a result that lies between 𝑥1
′′ and 𝑥2
′′ to war. This solution is 
possible because all bargains within this range are attainable. The allocation of 𝑥 lies between 
this bargaining range, regardless of whether 𝑥 describes the first or the second bargaining offer or 
the status quo allocation that remains in place. Figure 2 shows the bargaining range for player S1 
and S2. The horizontal axis is describing the whole issue space which ranges between zero and 
one. The partition of 𝑥 and probability of winning 𝑝 range also between zero and one and both 
are shown on the horizontal axis as well. The utility for player 2 is noted on the left hand side and 
the utility for player 1 on the right hand side. The utility for player 1 increases as 𝑥 and 𝑝 increase 
while the utility for player 2 decreases as 𝑥 and 𝑝 increase because the preferences are strictly 
opposed. The slopes for the war and the peace payoff functions are the same (the slope for player 
2’s functions is negative since the preference are opposed) and the positive costs of war ensure 
that the peace payoffs lie always above the war payoffs for any given point on the horizontal axis. 
Hence, the maximum utility for player 1 is reached as 𝑥 and p equal one and the maximum utility 
for player 2 is reached as 𝑥 and p equal zero. The dotted lines show the levels of indifference 
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between war and peace for both players for a given p. Since S1’s and S2’s utility for peace are 
better than for war at any point on the horizontal axis, less of 𝑥 than p is needed for S1 to reach 
the same utility and more of 𝑥 than p for S2 is necessary to gain the same utility. As already 
stated, both prefer any distribution of the good between 𝑥1
′′ and 𝑥2
′′ to war (Kydd 2000, 234-235).   
Figure 2: Bargaining Range: Kydd 2000 
  
 
Source: Kydd, Andrew (2000): Arms Races and Arms Control. Modeling the Hawk Perspective.  









The Second Bargaining Round 
The relative power 𝑝 is determined by the absolute levels of military spending 𝑀1, 𝑀2 which can 
be written as 𝑀𝑖 =  𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝑦𝑖 – the income 𝑦𝑖 multiplied by the share of income 𝑚𝑖 which is spend 
in military capabilities. The bottom lines, 𝑥1
′′ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥2
′′, of the players are also an implicit function 
of state’s military spending. Thus, as 𝑚𝑖 increases the bargaining range shifts either to the right 
as 𝑚1 increases or to the left as 𝑚2 increases. I will now describe under what conditions a 
revision of 𝑥 takes place or the status quo or the former agreement remains in place.   
Revision in favor of S1: If the former share 𝑥 for player 1 is smaller than 𝑥1
′′, 𝑥 < 𝑥1
′′, S1 would 
attack when the game moves to the attack decision. But in the second bargaining round, player 1 
can make an offer which lies in the bargaining range and makes both players better off than 
fighting. This offer will be 𝑥2
′′ because if player 2 would reject the offer end leave the former 
distribution, player 1 would attack, which makes player 2 worse off. Although the revision share 
is worse for player 2 than the former share, the new distribution is still better for her than 
fighting.  
No revision in the second bargaining round: 
If the former distribution lies within the bargaining range, neither side has an incentive to attack 
in the next round and the already implemented distribution will remain. Player 2 will reject any 
offer worse than the status quo and player 1 has no incentive to attack in the next round even if 
player 2 rejects his offer. Thus, neither side has a credible threat and there is no revision in the 
second bargaining round. 
Revision in favor of player S2: 
If the status quo is located to the right of 𝑥2
′′, 𝑥 > 𝑥2
′′, player 2 would be better off fighting in the 
next round than living with the status quo. Since a redistribution of the good that shifts 𝑥 to the 
left is preferred by both players to war, S1 will anticipate that and offer 𝑥2
′′. S2 will accept because 
𝑥2
′′ will make her better off than fighting. S1 could also offer 𝑥 < 𝑥2
′′ and player 2 would accept it. 
Although this offer is still better for S1 than war, 𝑥 = 𝑥2
′′ makes him better off than offering 𝑥 < 
𝑥2




The Arming Decision 
Player 2’s choice, 𝒎𝟐. 
In general, there are three possible levels of spending for player 2 which are shown in figure 3:  
 
Figure 3: The Arming Decision: Kydd 2000 
 
Source: Kydd, Andrew (2000): Arms Races and Arms Control. Modeling the Hawk Perspective.  
In: American Journal of Political Science 44 (2), S. 236.  
 
First, player 2 can spend so little that player 1 will make a demand in the bargaining round. That 
means player 2 spends between 0 and a critical value denoted 𝑀2
𝑑. The 𝑀2
𝑑 stands for the 
deterrence level spending of player 2. In this case, the bargaining range is located at the right of 
the status quo, 𝑥 < 𝑥1
′′, and player 1 will make a demand in the next round while player two 
makes a concession. 
Second, player 2 spends 𝑀2
𝑑 which is the level of spending by S2 that makes S1 indifferent 
between making a demand and obtaining the status quo. That means, player 2 spends enough to 
deter player 1. The equation that derives this level is: 𝑢1(𝑥, 𝑚1) ≥ 𝑢1(𝑝(𝑀1, 𝑀2
𝑑)𝑚1) − 𝑤1. 
Player 2 spends enough, so that the war payoff to the right side of the equation yields the same 
utility than the status quo or the first bargaining round allocation. Hence, when S2 spends 𝑀2
𝑑 the 
status quo 𝑥 lies within the bargaining range where no one has an incentive to fight after the 
bargaining round. No credible threat exists. If player 2 spends above 𝑀2
𝑑, it does not increase but 
rather decrease her utility as further military spending is expensive and 𝑥 is still located in the 
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bargaining range. The bargaining range is shifting to the left though, but the status quo will still 
be accepted by both players in the following round since neither has a credible threat to fight if 
the offer were rejected.  
Third, player 2 can spend so much, 𝑀2
𝐷, so she can make a demand on her own. Accordingly the 
bargaining range shifts so massively to the left that 𝑥 > 𝑥2
′′ and player 2 has a credible threat to 
fight. Player 2 spends enough to solve the following condition: 
𝑢2(𝑥, 𝑚2) ≤ 𝑢2(𝑝(𝑀1, 𝑀2
𝑑)𝑚2) − 𝑤2. The utility of the implemented allocation is smaller than 
the utility of fighting. Player 1 would then offer 𝑥 = 𝑥2
′′ in the second bargaining round which 
makes both better off than fighting.  
The optimal allocation:  
To find the optimal spending decision for player 2 we have to look for her best spending decision 
in case of war given her income and the spending level of S1. This level defines where p is 
located and as a consequence where 𝑥1
′′ and 𝑥2
′′ are located. If the absolute optimal spending level 
𝑀2
𝑟 for war is located within the deterrence zone, player 2 always prefers to allocate the 
deterrence level. If 𝑀2
𝑟 is below or above the deterrence level, we have to compare the utilities for 
making a concession or making a demand with the deterrence spending utility. In case of 
𝑢2(𝑥, 𝑚2
𝑑) > 𝑢2(𝑝(𝑀1, 𝑚2
𝑟𝑦2)𝑚2
𝑟) − 𝑤2 player 2 will spend the deterrence level spending. The 
richer player 2 is, the more likely it is that she will make a demand and vice versa. Note, that the 
model has no genuine challenger. Both states can make a demand if they are not satisfied with the 
status quo and if they are rich enough (ibid., 236). 
 
Player 1’s Choice and the first Bargaining Round 
Player 1’s arming choice is very similar to player 2’s arming choice. There are also three ranges 
of spending: If he spends a low amount player 2 will make a demand and he has to make a 
concession. If he spends at the deterrence level the status quo will remain in place and if he 
invests enough the make a demand player 2 will make a concession. It depends on his income 
how much he will spend in weapons. Military allocations do not only increase the players’ 
payoffs in case of a war and their bargaining result of 𝑥 but also decrease their utility as arming is 
costly. A richer player 1 can afford to arm at a high level and achieve a better bargain while a 
poor player rather cedes some portion of the good in order to save military spending.  
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Player 1’s offer in the first bargaining round depends on whether his utility for a revision arms 
race is higher or lower than his utility to arm for deterrence for a given status quo. If the status 
quo 𝑥0 lies within a certain range where player 1 is satisfied with the status quo and the necessary 
deterrence spending to maintain it, 𝑥0 remains in place. If the status quo 𝑥0 is low, player 1 does 
not have to spend much to achieve deterrence but he is also doing bad on 𝑥. Hence, he would like 
to spend the revision amount in the arming decision in order to achieve a better bargain. If 𝑥0 has 
nearly reached a value of one, he is very happy with the issue but has to spend too much for 
deterrence in the next round. Therefore, player 1 is better off releasing some 𝑥 to player 2 and 
spending less on military equipment. In the last two cases where player 1 is not satisfied and 
revision takes place, player 1 can perfectly anticipate the following decisions. Therefore, he will 
choose the optimal allocation of 𝑥 and both players can arm for deterrence and save resources 
because they do not have to spend the revision amount in the arming decision (ibid., 236-238).  
Conclusively, in the complete information version, there will be no war. Given that the players do 
are risk-averse and the good is divisible, the peace solution is always better than the war payoff. 
Hence, there is a bargaining range and a peaceful distribution is obtainable that makes both better 
off if one player is dissatisfied. The players can anticipate the decisions and wisely avoid the war 
and the arms race. According to Kydd, this outcome shows that arms races are just as inefficient 
as war and that the states have an incentive to avoid them. The players can anticipate the outcome 
under complete information and come to an agreement as Fearon (1995) in “rationalist 
explanations for war” predicts. Therefore, neither an arms race nor a war takes place.  
I think this a quite reasonable conclusion but according to Fearon, states can completely avoid 
war under complete information and save the costs. However, armament is reduced in Kydd’s 
model but not completely avoided. Whether reduced mutual build-ups to keep the status quo are 
not an arms race depends on the definition of arms races. As Buzan and Herring (1978) claim, 
arms races reflect underlying conflicts and/or mutual fear between states. If picking a new status 
quo in the first round is equal to a resolved conflict, the deterrence armament cannot be called an 
arms race because it does not reflect an underlying dispute anymore. Therefore, I agree with 




5.1.3.2. Incomplete Information 
Uncertainty is modeled over player 1’s income which can be one of two types: high income 𝑦1
ℎ 
and low income 𝑦1
𝑙 . Since the income of the players determines who much they spend in military 
equipment, player 2 faces also uncertainty about the relative power of the states. In contrast, 
Player 2’s income is common knowledge. According to Kydd uncertainty over the income refers 
to “the overall utility of a country to bear the costs of arms racing, now and into the future” 
(Kydd 2000, 238). The costs of war and the preferences over the issue at stake are clear. It is 
assumed that in the complete information version the income levels are chosen such that the 
status quo lies within the bargaining range of the first round if player 1 is poor. Therefore, a 
deterrence equilibrium will take place and the status quo will be maintained. If player 1 were 
rich, he would make a demand and player 2 would accept. In the next round, both players arm for 
deterrence to keep the new allocation.  
The solution of the incomplete version is very similar to complete information version:  
The attack decisions of the players and the second bargaining round are not affected by the 
uncertainty because the information about the income of player 1 is already revealed by the arms 
race. The absolute military spending is a function of the states’ income and the share of the states 
invest in armament. Hence, the military spending of the states reveals how rich player 1 is and, as 
the game proceeds to the second bargaining round both players are able to reach a bargain which 
makes both better off than fighting. Since the good is divisible, all intermediate outcomes are 
obtainable and war is avoided. In contrast to the complete information game, arms races can 
happen in the incomplete information version. An arms race equilibrium is only possible if player 
2 is skeptical that player 1 is rich. Both types of player 1 make a demand in the first round and 
player 2 will reject it. If player 1 is really rich, he arms for revision of the status quo in the second 
bargaining round. If player 1 is poor, he arms for deterrence and the status quo will remain in 
place. A bluff is not possible in this equilibrium since player two forces player one to reveal his 
type.  
If player 2 is trusting, she will accept player one’s demand. Both players arm at the deterrence 
level to maintain the recently reallocated 𝑥. The arms race is avoided although there is still a 
chance that player 1 is not really rich. Hence, a bluff is possible in this equilibrium. 
Summing up, even though there is incomplete information the states do not engage in war. 
Uncertainty over the state’s income/relative power can lead to an arms race but does not result in 
war. The arms race reveals the strength of the informed player and both players are able to find a 
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solution under complete information. A bluff is possible but will not be called if player 2 is not 
skeptical whether player 1 is really rich (ibid., 238-239).  
Finally, in this model an arms race never leads to war. In the complete information version of the 
game, the positive costs of war and non-gambling preferences provide a bargaining range which 
is similar to Fearon’s findings. The states arm for deterrence and a solution can be implemented 
according to the states strength which is shown by their armament. The good is divisible which 
makes it easier to find a solution because some partition is acceptable for both states. In the 
incomplete information version, the arms race reveals the states strength and the war decision is 
not influenced by uncertainty. Thus, Kydd stresses that the model shows no causal link between 
arms races and war. The states arm primarily to achieve their international goals if the states 
cannot completely observe their strength and to obtain a better bargain. This result is similar to 
Gray (1974) who claims that arms races are often means to substantiate diplomatic weight. They 
are not intended to guarantee a victor in the first place (Glaser 2000, 252; Gray 1974, 214-215). 
Gray further claims that arms races might be a substitute for war (Gray 1974, 216) to show power 
and therefore war itself is not necessary to reveal the state’s strength. Although, Kydd sees no 
causal link between arms races and war, I would say that the arms race leads to peace since it 
transmits information which enables the states to come to an agreement short of war.   
 
I will now turn to the analysis of Slantchev’s model which includes much more possible 
equilibria than the Kydd model. Arms races can here either lead to war or to peace or arms races 
and war can be completely avoided. 
 
5.2. Slantchev 2005: Military Coercion in Interstate Crises  
Slantchev’s focus lies on how states can credibly signal their intentions by the show of force. In a 
world where states have private information about their valuations for the good, costs or 
capabilities, arms build-ups can alter incentives and change the expected payoffs of the states. 
Therefore, arms build-ups are not completely sunk but also have tying hands effects because they 
increase the probability of winning and the state’s war payoff (Slantchev 2005, 533-534).
2
 For 
the following analysis, the tying hands or sunk discussion of armament is secondary because I 
will focus on the impact of mutual build-ups on war. Therefore, the signaling effect of the arms 
                                                 
2
 For an explanation of tying hands and sunk costs see Fearon 1997 
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race and its effects on war in the model will be my focus.
3
 Player 1 will be called “he” and player 
“she” in the following description.  
5.2.1. The Setting 
The Model characterizes an interstate dispute over a territory between two players (states), S1 and 
S2. The status quo power S1 is currently in possession of the territory and his valuation for the 
area 𝑣1 lies between zero and one: 𝑣1 ∈ (0,1). The valuation of the revisionist state 𝑣2 is private 
information and S1 believes that 𝑣2 is distributed on the interval [0,1]. Therefore, S1’s belief about 
S2’s valuation and S1’s own valuation are common knowledge whereas the exact valuation of 
player 2 is his private information. Three important assumptions are already given here: the states 
bargain over an indivisible good which is valued between zero and one. The model has one-sided 
incomplete information and the states are risk-neutral (ibid., 535-536). Uncertainty and 
indivisible goods make peaceful solutions more difficult in bargaining models (Fearon 1995)  
  
                                                 
3
 It is further important to mention that in all of the previously introduced models the probability of prevailing in a 
war is a function of the armament.   
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5.2.2. The Structure of the Game 
                   
Figure 4: Game Tree: Slantchev 2005 
 
At the first stage S1 chooses his military allocation level 𝑚1. If 𝑚1 = 0, S1 gives up any claim for 
the territory and gets nothing. Hence, S2 is now in possession of the good which gives him the 
payoff 𝑣2 and the game ends. In case of 𝑚1 > 0, which means that S1 invests in defense, S2 can 
either back down 𝑚2 = 0 or arm 𝑚2 > 0 and start a crises. If 𝑚2 = 0, S2 capitulates, the game 




𝑚1 > 0  𝑚1 = 0  






(-𝑚1, 𝑣2 – 𝑚2) 











for S2. In this case, S1 is still the owner of the territory. For all 𝑚2 > 0 the game moves to the next 
stage, where S1 can decide whether to capitulate, attack preemptively or resist. Capitulation 
means that S1 relinquishes the territory and the payoffs are – 𝑚1 and 𝑣2 – 𝑚2. If S1 attacks 
preemptively, the war payoffs for the countries are 𝑊1
𝑎(𝑚1, 𝑚2) for S1 and 𝑊2
𝑑(𝑚1, 𝑚2) for S2 
and the game ends. If S1 resists, the game proceeds to the last stage and S2 can decide whether to 
capitulate or attack. The capitulation decision leaves the payoffs 𝑣1 − 𝑚1 and – 𝑚2 and S1 keeps 
the territory. After an attack decision the game ends with the war payoffs 𝑊1
𝑑(𝑚1, 𝑚2) and 
𝑊2
𝑎(𝑚1, 𝑚2). 
The war payoffs of the third and the fourth stage depend on the level of mobilization 𝑚𝑖, 𝑚−𝑖, the 
costs of fighting 𝑐𝑖 ∈ (0,1), the players valuations for the territory and the offense-defense-
balance λ. The probability that player i prevails 
𝜆𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑖
𝜆𝑚𝑖+𝑚−𝑖
 is a function one’s own armament in 
relation to the overall military allocations weighed with λ, the offense-defense-balance. If λ = 1, 
there is no first-strike advantage, if λ > 1, offense dominates 𝑊𝑖
𝑎 > 𝑊𝑖
𝑑 and if λ < 1, defense 
dominates  𝑊𝑖
𝑑 > 𝑊𝑖










− 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑚𝑖 
 
The model contains a defense advantage which depends on the military technology (ibid., 536 
fn.9). According to the construction of the offense-defense balance in the model, the parameters 
not only favor a defense advantage but the attacking state also faces an offense disadvantage at 
the same time. Slantchev does not give any further theoretical explanation why he introduces a 
defense-advantage. He only claims that the results would be much more involved but do not 
change if one introduces an offense advantage (ibid., 536). According to Jervis theory of the 
offense-defense balance it is easier for the status quo power to defend (Jervis 1978, 194). In the 
model, only S1, the status quo power enjoys the defense advantage. Although, S2 would 
theoretically also benefit in case of being attacked, the construction of the model prevents this 
scenario. As the analysis will show, S1 never attacks because of the defense-advantage. 
Therefore, S2 can never defend and only S1, the status quo power, can profit from the defense-
advantage as Jervis states.  
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5.2.3. Analyzing the Game: 
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which requires that strategies are 
sequentially rational given the beliefs, and that beliefs are consistent with the strategies, and 
derived from Bayes rule whenever possible (Kydd 2015, 93). I will not describe the solution of 
the whole game but rather the most important steps to understand realization of the different 
equilibria. I will mainly focus on the arms race leads to peace and the arms race leads to war 
equilibria. 
S2 would attack S1 at the fourth stage, only if her expected payoff is as good as capitulating. That 
means 𝑊2





− 𝑐2 − 𝑚2 = −𝑚2 
𝑣2 ≥ 𝑐2 +
𝑐2𝑚1
𝜆𝑚2
≡  𝛾(𝑚1, 𝑚2) > 0 
Accordingly, all types 𝑣2  ≥ 𝛾(𝑚1, 𝑚2) attack, if S1 resists and all 𝑣2 < 𝛾(𝑚1, 𝑚2) capitulate. 
Turning now to S1’s decision: If S1 resists, the game proceeds to the fourth stage and  his payoff 
would be: 
  𝑅1(𝑚1, 𝑚2) = 𝐺(𝛾)(𝑣1 − 𝑚1) + (1 − 𝐺(𝛾)) 𝑊1
𝑑(𝑚1, 𝑚2) 
𝑅1(𝑚1, 𝑚2) stands for S1’s resisting payoff and G(γ) characterizes S1’s updated belief.  
If S1 resists and S2 capitulates at the fourth stage, S1 would receive 𝑣1 − 𝑚1 which is larger than 
S1’s payoff if S2 would attack at the fourth stage 𝑊1
𝑑(𝑚1, 𝑚2). Because of the defense advantage 
the payoff 𝑊1
𝑑(𝑚1, 𝑚2) (S1 resists at the third stage and S2 attacks at the fourth stage) is larger 
than 𝑊1
𝑎(𝑚1, 𝑚2) (S1 preempts at third stage and the game ends). Leaving the following payoff 
order for S1: 
𝑣1 − 𝑚1 > 𝑊1
𝑑 > 𝑊1
𝑎 
The resisting payoffs 𝑣1 − 𝑚1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑊1
𝑑 are both better than the preemption payoff 𝑊1
𝑎, so S1 
always favors resisting over preemption regardless of his posterior belief. 
𝑅1(𝑚1, 𝑚2) > 𝑊1
𝑎(𝑚1, 𝑚2) for any 𝜆 < 1 
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Hence, S1 either resists or capitulates at the third stage (ibid., 536). The defense advantage 
achieves that S1 has no incentive to preempt. According to Fearon a defense advantage widens 
the bargaining range and it would be easier for both states to come to an agreement without 
fighting (Fearon 1995, 403).  
S2’s equilibrium behavior depends on the payoffs that she can get from attacking at her final 
decision node, from capitulating at the second stage or from compelling S1. Compelling describes 
certain capitulation by S1 at the third stage after he has observed some allocation level 𝑚2̅̅ ̅̅  by S2. 
S2 would never mobilize at a higher level than her own valuation. That means 𝑚2̅̅ ̅̅  ≥ 1 levels will 
always be suboptimal for S2 because 𝑣2 − 𝑚2 is the best outcome S2 could reach after S1 has 
mobilized. Thus, Slantchev does not implement a budget constraint but 𝑣2 serves as an upper 
bound for 𝑚2  (ibid., fn. 10).  S2’s strategy can be described by three cutpoints which divide her 
valuation types into ranges where S2 behaves the same way. Type 𝛽(𝑚1) stands for indifference 
between war and assured compellence, type 𝛼(𝑚1) describes whether she is indifferent between 
capitulation and assured compellence, and type 𝛿(𝑚1) whether she is indifferent between war 
and capitulation. Depending on the location of the cutpoints and the valuation of S2 the states 
capitulate, fight, deter the other state or compel a concession. I will now describe how Slantchev 
deduces those cutpoints (ibid., 536-537).  
𝜷(𝒎𝟏) → indifference between war and assured compellence: 
𝑊2
𝑎(𝑚1, 𝑚2
∗(𝑚1, 𝛽(𝑚1))) =  𝛽(𝑚1) −  ?̅?2(𝑚1) 
The left side of the equation describes the war payoff which depends on the optimal allocation of 
𝑚2 for the type 𝛽(𝑚1) given that S1 has armed at some 𝑚1 and given that player S1 has resisted. 
The optimal level 𝑚2
∗(𝑚1, 𝛽(𝑚1)) can be calculated by the derivation with respect to 𝑣2 and 







𝜆𝑚2 +  𝑚1
− 𝑐2 − 𝑚2
𝑑𝑣2
















∗  is the optimal allocation level for S2 if she wants to fight for sure some 𝑚1. We can now 
insert 𝑚2






 into the war payoff and substitute 𝑣2by 𝛽(𝑚1). To solve for 
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the cutpoint 𝛽(𝑚1), where S2 is indifferent between fighting with her optimal military allocation 
and compelling S1, the war payoff must equal the assuered compellence payoff :  
𝑊2
𝑎(𝑚1, 𝑚2
∗(𝑚1, 𝛽(𝑚1))) =  𝛽(𝑚1) −  ?̅?2(𝑚1) 
Solving for 𝛽(𝑚1): 





 All types  𝒗𝟐 > 𝜷(𝒎𝟏) prefer assured compellence to war and all 
𝒗𝟐 ≤ 𝜷(𝒎𝟏) prefer war to assured compellence. 
This results from the first derivations of the optimal war payoff and the assured compellence 









𝑑 (𝑣2) −  ?̅?2(𝑚1)
𝑑 𝑣2
= 1 
The derivation of the war payoff is smaller than 1 while the derivation of the compellence payoff 
equals 1. It follows that the payoffs for any 𝑣2 > 𝛽(𝑚1)  must be larger for compellence because 
the payoff derived by the compellence function is increasing faster than the payoff from war. At 
𝑣2 = 𝛽(𝑚1) S2 is indifferent between war and compellence but for any 𝑣2 > 𝛽(𝑚1) the 
compellence term yields a higher utility because it is increasing faster. Thus all 𝑣2 > 𝛽(𝑚1) are 





𝜶(𝒎𝟏) → indifference between capitulation and assured compellence: 
 
The type 𝛼(𝑚1) is indifferent between assured compellence (payoff 𝑣2 − 𝑚2) and capitulation, 
(payoff 0) if 𝑚2̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑚1) was observed. Substituting 𝑣2 by 𝛼(𝑚1) and 𝑚2 by ?̅?2(𝑚1) that yields: 
𝛼(𝑚1) − ?̅?2(𝑚1) = 0 
 
The equation is simply solved:  
37 
 
 ↔  𝛼(𝑚1) = ?̅?2(𝑚1) 
Because the derivative of the compellence payoff  
𝑑 𝑣2−?̅?2(𝑚1)
𝑑 𝑣2
= 1 is larger than the first order 
condition of the capitulation payoff  
𝑑 0
𝑑𝑣2
= 0,  
 all types 𝒗𝟐 ≥  𝜶(𝒎𝟏) prefer assured compellence to capitulation and all types 
𝒗𝟐 < 𝜶(𝒎𝟏) prefer capitulation to assured compellence. 
𝜹(𝒎𝟏) → indifference between war and capitulation 
The optimal war payoff 𝑊2
𝑎(𝑚1, 𝑚2) has to be equated with the capitulation payoff, 0: 
𝑊2
𝑎 (𝑚1, 𝑚2
∗(𝑚1, 𝛿(𝑚1))) = 0 
Substituting 𝑣2 by 𝛿(𝑚1) and inserting 𝑚2
∗  leaves: 







According to Slantchev, the war payoff strictly increases in type
4
 which yields that  
 all 𝒗𝟐 < 𝜹(𝒎𝟏) prefer capitulation to optimal war and all 
𝒗𝟐 ≥  𝜹(𝒎𝟏) prefer war to capitulation (ibid., 537). 
The equilibrium behavior depends on the relation between the types 𝛽(𝑚1), 𝛼(𝑚1) and  𝛿(𝑚1), 
and the location of S2’s valuation. I will not mathematically show how Slantchev deduces the two 
possible locations of the cutpoints. Instead, I will focus on the interpretation of the two following 
cases and their corresponding equilibria:       
1. 𝛼(𝑚1) ≤ 𝛿(𝑚1); indifference between assured compellence and capitulation  ≤ 
indifference between war and capitulation 
                                                 
4
 Im am not sure whether the claim that the war payoff strictly increases in type is clear: Inserting different values 
into the derivation of the war payoff with respect to 𝑣2, provides also some negativ values. I think that the war payoff 
only strictly increases in type if   
if  𝑚2





2.  𝛿(𝑚1) < 𝛼(𝑚1) and 𝛼(𝑚1) < 𝛽(𝑚1);  indifference between war and capitulation < 
indifference between assured compellence and capitulation < indifference between war 
and assured compellence 
In the first case 𝛼(𝑚1) ≤ 𝛿(𝑚1) the type who is indifferent between assured compellence and 
capitulation has a lower valuation than the type who is indifferent between war and assured 
compellence. The states do not fight, S2 either capitulates at the second stage, if she is a low 
valuation type, or she coerces a concession from S1 at the third stage if she is a higher valuation 
type. In the former case, S1 keeps the territory and in the second case S2 coerces S1 to relinquish 
the territory. All types of S2 whose valuation is smaller than 𝛼(𝑚1) capitulate and all types whose 
valuation is larger than 𝛼(𝑚1) mobilize at the compellence level ?̅?2(𝑚1) in equilibrium
5
. S1 
capitulates for sure if he observes an allocation level ?̅?2(𝑚1) (ibid., 537).  
A bluff by S2, which means that she arms at ?̅?2(𝑚1) although she would not fight at the last 
stage, is possible in this equilibrium but will not be called. This equilibrium is only obtainable if 
S1 is expected to capitulate which depends on S2’s willingness to fight. S2’s willingness to fight 
again depends on her costs of fighting and S1’s armament. Counterintuitively, bluffing by is S2 is 
only possible if her costs of fighting are high (this parameter is observable), she is a “weak” type. 
The reason is the impact that a “weak” S2 has on S1’s arming decision. If S1 thinks S2 is “weak” 
he concludes that she will not mobilize at a high level. Therefore, he does not spend much on 
armament to reduce the costly allocation. These high costs only enable the bluff because the 
probability of being forced to make a concession is much lower if S2 is weak. The probability that 
S2 has armed at the compellence level ?̅?2(𝑚1) while she would not fight if S1 resists, is very 
low. Accordingly, S1 does not resist if he observes ?̅?2(𝑚1) even though it is still possible that S2 
is bluffing. The bluff works because only a small group of low valuation types of S2 is willing to 
pay the costs for the expensive signal (ibid., 537-538, 541).  
Eventually, there are two possibilities: first, deterrence by S1 works and S2 capitulates. Therefore, 
no arms race and no war takes place because S2 does not respond to S1’s armament. She gives up 
at the second stage. Although, I interpret the build-up of only one side not as an arms race, higher 
military allocations by S1 never increase the risk of war in this equilibrium. Second, S2 arms and 
coerces a redistribution of the territory because S1 capitulates. In this case, arms build-ups lead to 
peace. If 𝛼(𝑚1) ≤ 𝛿(𝑚1) higher armament of the states always provide a peaceful solution 
                                                 
5
 provided that ?̅?2(𝑚1) is feasible 
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because one of them capitulates. Uncertainty and indivisibility of the good do not lead to war 
because build-ups serve as a signal of resolve and achieve deterrence. 
 
In the second case, 𝛿(𝑚1) < 𝛼(𝑚1) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼(𝑚1) < 𝛽(𝑚1) the type who is indifferent between 
war and assured compellence has a lower valuation than the type who is indifferent between 
assured compellence and capitulation. War, capitulation and compellence are possible and all 
challenges of S2 are genuine. All 𝑣2 ≤ 𝛿 < 𝑎 < 𝛽 prefer capitulation to assured compellence and 
war. All 𝑣2 ∈ (𝛿, 𝛽] prefer war to capitulation and to assured compellence and all 𝑣2 > 𝛽 prefer 
assuered compellence to war and capitulation. All types 𝑣2 ∈ (𝛿, 𝛽) arm at the optimal war level 
𝑚2
∗(𝑚1, 𝑣2) and all types 𝑣2 > 𝛽 arm at the assured compellence level ?̅?2(𝑚1). The mid 
valuation types 𝑣2 ∈ (𝛿, 𝛽) are the most dangerous ones because their valuation is not low 
enough to be deterred by S1’s allocation and they are also not willing to compel S1 because it is 
too costly compared to their valuation. If S1 observes an armament 𝑚2
∗(𝑚1, 𝑣2) he separates fully 
and infers S2’s type with certainty and both players fight with complete information. In this case 
the revelation of the type by the armament leads to war because both players do not come to a 
solution which is better than fighting. One could argue that after the armament decision it is not 
the incomplete information which leads to war but rather the complete information that is 
revealed by the armament. This result is contrary to the incomplete information version of Kydd 
2000 where the revelation of the type always leads to peace because the players are able to find a 
solution with the additional information (ibid., 538). Bluffing is not possible in this case. If S2 
had low costs, she is “strong”, a low mobilization level of S1 would ensure his capitulation and 
therefore, he eliminates the risk of a bluff ex ante. He arms at a higher level and bluffing becomes 
too expensive for S2, even if it is certain succeed (ibid., 541). War happens in this equilibrium 
because S1 faces a strong S2 and he arms at a higher level to prevent a concession. S2 also arms at 
a higher level but this does not suffice to achieve assured compellence. As 𝑚1 raises, the costs to 
coerce S1 to give up the territory become very high and makes assured compellence inefficient 
for S2. Since the state’s higher levels of armament increased their war payoff compared to the 
capitulation payoff, they prefer to fight after the information is revealed. Therefore, mutual 
armament leads to war in this equilibrium.  
Summing up, in the first case where 𝛼(𝑚1) ≤ 𝛿(𝑚1) (the type who is indifferent between 
assured compellence and capitulation has a lower valuation than the type who is indifferent 
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between war and assured compellence) deterrence by S1 works or the arms race leads to peace 
because S1 capitulates. Although, we have incomplete information and an indivisible good the 
states never fight because the armament serves a signal of strength. In the second case 
where  𝛿(𝑚1) < 𝛼(𝑚1) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼(𝑚1) < 𝛽(𝑚1) (the type who is indifferent between war and 
assured compellence has a lower valuation than the type who is indifferent between assured 
compellence and capitulation) war can happen after the build-up. The armament of S2 perfectly 
reveals her type and if she is a mid-valuation type, the states go to war with complete 
information.    
6. Discussion 
In the Kydd model, complete information, a perfectly divisible good and no gambling preferences 
provide peace without an arms race. The deterrence arming perfectly operates as a measure of 
strength to come to an optimal agreement for both states. Hence, the states find a solution without 
any arms race or war. Therefore, in the complete information version arms build-ups cannot have 
any impact on war. But it is remarkable though that the states cannot completely avoid the 
deterrence arming since it is their main instrument to achieve an acceptable bargain. In the 
incomplete information version, an arms race is possible, but it does not lead to war. Therefore, 
Kydd denies any causal link between arms races and war in his model. I think the arms race leads 
to peace since the unknown component, the income and the state’s relative power, is revealed. 
The arms race is the reason why the states are able to achieve a solution short of war.  
In my opinion, the no war equilibria result is massively promoted by the assumptions of the 
model especially under uncertainty. The divisible good facilitates a peaceful agreement most 
notably under incomplete information. Although an arms race increases the war payoff for both 
states in this information setting, a bargaining range exists because war is still costly and the 
states have an incentive to avoid it. If the good were not divisible or only some intermediate 
outcomes were reachable, war might happen. I think this is the scenario in Slantchev model, 
where the states fight after the revelation of the information. In his model, there is no possibility 
to split the good according to the state’s strength. Furthermore, an initial attack decision before 
the states arm is not modeled. But this decision gave both players the option to avoid a costly 
arms race. Kydd himself stressed in his formalization of the spiral model that states can attack at 
any time and therefore they should also have the option to preventively attack (Kydd 1997, 380). 
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Under uncertainty, the information whether a state is strong or not would not be revealed at this 
point and uncertainty would influence this decision. A war but not an arms race equilibrium 
would be imaginable in this case. Moreover, a majority of game theoretic war models include 
uncertainty over the costs of war which is interpreted as a state’s resolve (Kydd 2015, 93). If 
Kydd included uncertainty over the costs of war, this information would not be revealed by the 
arms race. The states’ believes would influence the attack, the bargaining and the build-up 
decision and a war equilibrium could be possible. Summing up, other assumptions might lead to 
an arms race which causes war. Nevertheless, such claims remain speculative and difficult to 
prove without actually modeling it. Whether the arms race would be the main driver under such 
different assumptions requires an explicit formulation of a model. 
 
Slantchev on the other hand analyzes a one-sided incomplete information model. The states do 
not have gambling preferences but the good, a territory, is indivisible which makes a bargain 
difficult. Like in the Kydd model, the arming serves as a signal of strength in bargaining. But in 
Slantchev’s model the uncertainty affects the attack decision and war equilibria are possible. 
Depending on the costs of war, the states’ valuations and the other state’s arming there are many 
possible outcomes: the status quo state either deters the challenger and no arms race and no war 
takes place; the status quo state arms, the challenger arms but the status quo state decides not to 
attack and the arms race leads to peace; both states arm and decide to fight.  
Since Slantchev does not provide an analysis of a complete information version, it is difficult to 
estimate whether ex ante uncertainty is the main driver of an arms race war causality. It is very 
interesting though, that in an incomplete information model the revelation of information through 
arming does not always lead to peace. In the assured compellence equilibrium where both players 
arm and player 1 capitulates mutual armament leads to peace because player 2 armed at a high 
enough level to coerce player 1. The reallocation of the territory happens peacefully and 
uncertainty lasts during the game but does not lead to war. In the war equilibrium on the other 
hand, the armament of player 2 reveals her type and shows that her valuation is not high enough 
to arm at a compellence level. The players go to war with complete information because it yields 
to highest payoff for both. If the good were divisible I think it would be possible to split the 
territory after the armament revealed the type of player 2 like in Kydd’s model. Since all 
information were perfectly known, the states do not have gambling preferences and war is costly 
a bargaining range would exist. But only one state can possess the territory in Slantchev’s model 
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and both players are not able to come to an agreement although all information is known. Hence, 
in my opinion the indivisibility of the good is a major reason why the states fight after they 
armed. In addition, like in Kydd’s model, an initial attack choice is not modeled and there is no 
possibility of a preventive war. Another similarity is that it is not possible not to arm and to 
maintain the status quo. Player 1 in Slantchev model has to arm in order to keep the territory he 
possess at the beginning of the game. In Kydd’s model the players also arm at the deterrence 
level to keep the status quo. 
Conclusively, in both models an arms race reveals information about the players’ strength and 
has great influence on the information structure especially under incomplete information. It is 
remarkable that uncovered information within the model yields different results depending on the 
nature of the good and the revealed parameters. Although ex ante incomplete information is one 
of the reasons for war in game theory models, complete information which is revealed in the 
model does not necessarily prevent war. Even though, war is still costly and risky.  
7. Conclusion 
The literature showed that there are only a few game theory models which deal with the question 
whether arms races cause war or peace. I reviewed them by shortly noting their underlying 
formal assumptions which cause the arms race. I paid special attention under which assumptions 
arms races cause war. Whether these results are distinct to the predictions of formal models, 
which only deal with war onset without arms races, was also mentioned. As a result, the models 
in the overview contained very different modeling conditions and came to varying predictions 
regardless of their structure, solution concept or publication year. I decided to analyze Kydd 
(2000) and Slantchev (2005) because they came to opposing predictions: Kydd (2000), on the one 
hand, does not have any war equilibria even under uncertainty over relative power. Therefore, an 
arms race does not lead to war in his model. Slantchev (2005), on the other hand, provides 
multiple possible equilibria in one model with incomplete information: arms races can either lead 
to war or to peace; an arms race and war can be avoided. The analysis of both models showed 
that arming is one means which the states use to show force and to achieve a better bargain. In 
the complete information version of Kydd’s model, the states neither engaged in an arms race nor 
fought. Under uncertainty, an arms race reveals the relative power of both states and they can 
achieve a bargain since all intermediate outcomes of the issue at stake are reachable. However, in 
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Slantchev’s model it depends on the players’ valuations and the costs of fighting whether the type 
of the informed player will be revealed by the arms race. This revelation does not necessarily lead 
to peace because the states are not able to split the good. Eventually, an arms race can uncover 
information but it depends on the parameter which is revealed and the structure of the good 
whether this information provides peace. An indivisible good seems to make it much more 
difficult to achieve a solution without fighting, even if the arms race ensures complete 
information within the model. In general, it is not finally possible to clearly state which 
assumptions are the reason for an arms race-war equilibrium. In Slantchev’s model, it seems that 
uncertainty over the states valuation and an indivisible good constitute the main drivers but, this 
conclusion can be obsolete in a model with uncertainty over the costs of war.  
For generalizing statements, much more different models with different modeling conditions 
have to be implemented. Not only varying uncertainty parameters would be valuable, but also a 
study whether more than one round of arming in bargaining models provide different result. In 
addition, the weapons should accumulate over time, like in Fearon’s unpublished paper (Fearon 
2011). Moreover, none of the game theory models described in the literature overview includes 
an explicit treatment of qualitative improvements. Since technical innovations become more 
important (Brito and Intriligator 2000, 51) it would be suitable to include such improvements in a 
model. An offense-defense-balance addresses differences in military equipment by modeling 
whether states arm to fight (offense advantage) or to deter (defense advantage). But the offense-
defense-balance does not address whether qualitative improvements or quantitative 
improvements are more dangerous. The Brito and Intriligator (1984) model which I introduced 
concludes that a qualitative arms race is more dangerous but it is based on differential equations 
and does not include decisions. In contrast, Huntington (1958) suggests quantitative 
improvements are more dangerous than qualitative progresses. It would be fruitful to include this 
discussion in game theory models. 
On a final note, it is not conclusively resolved under which assumptions arms races lead to war or 
to peace and there is room for much more game theory models on arms races and war. 
Bargaining models with more rounds of arming, accumulating weapons stocks and a 
measurement of technological improvements could be the first step.   
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